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TO ARBITRATE OR NOT TO
ARBITRATE? THE PROTECTION OF
RIGHTS UNDER THE AGE
DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT
ACT
Steck v. Smith Barney. Harris Upham & Co.'
I. INTRODUCTION
The attempt to compel arbitration in a dispute involving federal statutory
rights given judicial protection brings into tension two firmly established na-
tional policies. On one side, there is the national policy as set forth in the
Federal Arbitration Act' (hereinafter Arbitration Act) which strongly favors
arbitration agreements.' On the other side, there is the national policy of pro-
viding broad access to the courts as the means of enforcing certain statutorily
granted rights.' The tension is created when an individual bound by an arbi-
tration agreement raises a claim based on a federal statutory right which is
1. 661 F. Supp. 543 (D. N.J. 1987).
2. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1947).
3. The Arbitration Act itself embodies this strong national policy. The Arbitra-
tion Act mandates that a privately made agreement to arbitrate is "valid, irrevocable,
and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation
of any contract." Id. § 2. The Arbitration Act further provides that a court must stay
its proceedings pending arbitration if it is convinced the issue involved is arbitrable. Id.
at § 3. The Arbitration Act directs the court to issue an order requiring the parties to
arbitrate upon being satisfied that one party has failed, neglected, or refused to arbi-
trate in contravention of a valid arbitration agreement. Id. at § 4.
4. Congress has enacted various statutes granting judicially enforceable rights.
For instance, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (hereinafter Title VII) assures equality
of employment opportunity by eliminating discrimination in the workplace, and vests
final enforcement of its provisions in the courts. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3, 2000e-
5(f) (1964). The Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter FLSA) guarantees individual
workers minimum wage and hour protection, and grants broad access to the courts for
enforcement. 29 U.S.C. §§ 206, 207, 216(b) (1967). The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (hereinafter ERISA) protects employees from interference with their stat-
utory and private employer benefit plans, and provides for enforcement of its provisions
in the federal courts. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1140, 1451 (1974).
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judicially protected. This is precisely the tension faced by the district court of
New Jersey in Steck v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co.' The court faced
the issue of whether a claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act' (hereinafter ADEA) could be compelled to arbitration under the Arbitra-
tion Act.' The court concluded that the plaintiff's claim under the ADEA was
nonarbitrable, despite its finding that the claim fell within the scope of the
arbitration agreement.* The court reached this conclusion by examining the
text and legislative history of the ADEA and judicial precedent involving anal-
ogous statutory schemes.*
II. BACKGROUND
The court in Steck faced two imposing precedents as it considered the
case. The first related to the tension previously mentioned. If the court found
the claim nonarbitrable, it would be forced to justify abandoning the strong
national policy in favor of arbitration agreements. The second precedent came
from the Supreme Court's decision in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.10 The Supreme Court therein set forth the general
rule that there is no presumption against arbitration of statutory claims in the
Arbitration Act." The Court concluded that a party who agrees to arbitrate is
bound to do so unless Congress indicates an intent to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies in the statute itself.1 In light of Mitsubishi, the court in
Steck would be forced to find the necessary Congressional intent in order to
conclude the statutory claim was nonarbitrable.
A. The Tension
The Arbitration Act was passed in 1924 in response to the longstanding
refusal by the courts to enforce privately made arbitration agreements.1 ' The
5. 661 F. Supp. at 543.
6. 29 U.S.C. § 621-634 (1967).
7. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 543.
8. Id. at 545, 547.
9. Id. at 547.
10. 473 U.S. 614 (1985),
11. Id. at 625.
12. Id. at 627.
13. The House Report discussing the Arbitration Act explicitly refers to this
hostility:
The need for the law arises from an anachronism of our American law. Some
centuries ago, because of the jealousy of the English courts for their own ju-
risdiction, they refused to enforce specific agreements to arbitrate upon the
grounds that the courts were thereby ousted from their jurisdiction. This jeal-
ousy became firmly embedded in the English common law and was adopted
with it by the American courts.
HR REP. No. 98, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1-2 (1924). The Senate Report discussing
[Vol. 1988
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Arbitration Act mandates that arbitration agreements "shall be valid, irrevo-
cable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for
the revocation of any contract."1 The purpose behind the Arbitration Act was
to ensure judicial enforcement of arbitration agreements.1 The decisions of
the Supreme Court subsequent to its passage solidly confirmed this purpose
and firmly established the strong federal policy in favor of arbitration agree-
ments." This policy not only meant judicial enforcement of arbitration
awards, it also meant that any claim coming within the arbitration provision
must go to arbitration.1
7
The tension arose when Congress responded to inequities and discrimina-
tion in the workplace by enacting statutes which granted individual employees
certain substantive rights.18 These statutes provided minimum wage and hour
guarantees and sought to protect individuals from discrimination in the work-
judicial hostility cites two additional reasons for the hostility:
The expressed fear on the part of the courts that arbitration tribunals did not
possess the means to give full or proper redress, and also the doubt they enter-
tained as to their rights to compel an unwilling party to submit this cause to
such a tribunal, thus denying to him the right to submit the same to the
ordinary courts of justice for hearing and determination.
S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1924).
14. 9 U.S.C. § 2.
15. The longstanding judicial hostility toward arbitration agreements made legis-
lative action necessary to accomplish the purpose of enforcing privately made arbitra-
tion agreements. According to the House Report:
The courts have felt that the precedent was too strongly fixed to be over-
turned without legislative enactment, although they have frequently criticized
the rule and recognized its illogical nature and the injustice which results
from it. This bill declares simply that such agreements for arbitration shall
be enforced, and provides a procedure in the Federal courts for their
enforcement.
H.R. REP No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. at 1-2 (1924). The Report went on to note that
the Arbitration Act was to assure that "an arbitration agreement is placed upon the
same footing as other contracts, where it belongs." id. at 1.
16. rhe Supreme Court of the United States has consistently concluded that
"the preeminent concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agree-
ments into which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously
enforce agreements to arbitrate." Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213,
221 (1985); see e.g., Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460
U.S. 1 (1983); Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 107 S.Ct. 2332 (1987);
Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navi-
gation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960).
17. The Court in Moses H. Cone set forth the general rule that "questions of
arbitrability must be addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring
arbitration .... The Arbitration Act establishes that, as a matter of federal law, any
doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitra-
tion." Moses H Cone, 460 U.S. at 24-25.
18. See supra, note 4.
19881
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place."9 The enforcement provisions of these statutes commonly allowed a civil
action in any federal or state court of competent jurisdiction for such legal or
equitable relief as may be appropriate.' 0 The plain language of the enforce-
ment provisions confirms that the protection of these rights was to be vested in
the courts." None of these statutes mention arbitration as a possible enforce-
ment procedure, despite its broad and effective use in the employment context.
Before the court in Steck could declare the claim nonarbitrable, it would
be forced to deal with the tension between judicial respect for arbitration
agreements and judicial protection of statutory rights.
B. The Mitsubishi Mandate
In Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court faced the issue of whether a statutory
claim under the Sherman Act, which fell within the arbitration provision of a
private agreement, was subject to mandatory arbitration pursuant to the Arbi-
tration Act." Mitsubishi Motors and Soler entered into a contract whereby
Soler agreed to sell Mitsubishi-manufactured vehicles which were distributed
under contract to Soler by Mitsubishi Motors."' Due to decreased sales, Soler
sought to delay shipment of vehicles which was in violation of the contract."
The contract between the parties provided that all disputes, controversies
or differences which may arise between the parties related to the contract
"shall be finally settled in arbitration.""5 Mitsubishi Motors eventually with-
held shipment and brought an action in federal court to compel arbitration."
However, Soler sought to avoid arbitration by raising a statutory claim.'" The
19. See 29 U.S.C. § 206 (certain employees guaranteed a minimum wage); 29
U.S.C. § 207 (maximum work week established); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (employment
discrimination based on sex, color, religion, race or national origin prohibited); 29
U.S.C. § 1140 (employees protected from interference with benefit rights).
20. See infra text accompanying note 21.
21. The FLSA explicitly states:
An action to recover the liability prescribed in either of the preceding
sentences may be maintained against any employer (including a public
agency) in any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction by any one or
more employees for and in behalf of himself and themselves and other em-
ployees similarly situated.
29 U.S.C. § 216(b). Title VII states, "a civil action may be brought against the respon-
dent named in the charge (A) by the person claiming to be aggrieved. . ." 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-5(f). ERISA states, "if you are discriminated against for asserting your rights,
you may seek assistance from the U.S. Department of Labor or you may file suit in
Federal Court." 29 U.S.C. § 1440.
22. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 614, 616.
23. Id. at 617.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 618.
27. Id. at 619-20. Soler brought a claim under the anti-trust provisions of the
[Vol. 1988
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district court held the statutory claim to be arbitrable due to the international
character of the contract.2 ' The district court so held, despite its recognition
that the court of appeals had uniformly held the rights conferred by antitrust
laws to be "of a character inappropriate for arbitration." 2' Accordingly, the
court of appeals reversed."0
The Supreme Court in Mitsubishi reversed the court of appeals inasmuch
as it precluded arbitration of the claim."' The Court concluded there was no
reason to depart from the strong federal policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments.82 The Supreme Court noted its prior observation that "the preeminent
concern of Congress in passing the Act was to enforce private agreements into
which parties had entered, and that concern requires that we rigorously en-
force agreements to arbitrate".33 The Court held the agreement to arbitrate as
enforceable in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act."
Sherman Act, alleging that Mitsubishi and the parent company "had conspired to di-
vide markets in restraint of free trade." Id. Soler then argued it could not be compelled
to arbitrate a statutory claim not mentioned in the arbitration agreement. Id.
28. Id. at 616-17. The parties to the contract calling for arbitration were Mitsub-
ishi Motors Corporation, a Japanese corporation, Chrysler International, S.A., a Swiss
corporation, and Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., a Puerto Rico corporation. The agree-
ment called for arbitration in Japan. Id. In holding the agreement enforceable due to
the international character of the contract, the district court relied on a prior Supreme
Court decision in Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 508 (1974). Id. at 621. In
Scherk, an American company, Alberto-Culver, purchased business enterprises from
Scherk, a German citizen, under a contract with an arbitration clause providing for
arbitration of controversies in Paris, France. Scherk, 417 U.S. at 511. The American
company filed suit in Illinois. The Supreme Court enforced the agreement and required
Alberto-Culver to arbitrate in Paris. Id. The Court reasoned:
A contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which a dispute
shall be litigated and the law to be applied is . . . an almost indispensible
precondition essential to any international business transaction.
A parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce an interna-
tional arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but
would invite unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to
secure tactical litigation advantages .... damage the fabric of international
commerce and trade, and imperil the willingness and ability of businessmen
to enter into international commercial agreement.
Id. at 516-517.
29. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 620-21 n.9.
30. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 723 F.2d 155, 169 (1st
Cir. 1983).
31. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 640.
32. Id. at 626.
33. Id. at 625-26.
34. Id. at 640. The Court stated "we require this representative of the American
business community to honor its bargain . . . by holding this agreement to arbitrate
.enforce(able] in accord with the explicit provisions of the Arbitration Act.'" Id.
The Court relied on the international character of the agreement and its reasoning in
19881
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The Court rejected Soler's allegation that statutory claims were nonarbi-
trable absent an express agreement to arbitrate those specific claims.85 In-
stead, the Court found "no warrant in the Arbitration Act for implying in
every contract within its ken a presumption against arbitration of statutory
claims."" This general rule, referred to as the "Mitsubishi mandate" in
Steck, was not to be interpreted as saying all controversies involving statutory
rights were suitable for arbitration.8 7 However, the mere fact the claim was
statutory in nature did not indicate it was unsuitable for arbitration.38
The Court adopted a two-step analysis as the process to be used in deter-
mining whether a statutory claim was arbitrable.8 ' First, the court must deter-
mine "whether the parties' agreement to arbitrate reached the statutory is-
sue."' 0 Second, "whether legal constraints external to the parties' agreement
foreclosed the arbitration of those claims." 1 The second step involves an anal-
ysis of the Congressional intent behind the statute to determine if Congress
Scherk in reaching this holding. The Court concluded, "concerns of international com-
ity, respect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensitivity to
the need of the international commercial system for predictability in the resolution of
disputes require that we enforce the parties' agreement." Id. at 629.
35. Id. at 625. Soler argued that "as a matter of law a court may not construe an
arbitration agreement to encompass claims arising out of statutes designed to protect a
class to which the party resisting arbitration belongs 'unless [that party] has expressly
agreed' to arbitrate those claims." Id. The Court interpreted Soler's argument to mean
"that the arbitration clause must specifically mention the statute giving rise to the
claims that a party to the clause seeks to arbitrate." Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 627. The Court stated:
That is not to say that all controversies implicating statutory rights are suita-
ble for arbitration. There is no reason to distort the process of contract inter-
pretation to ferret out the inappropriate. Just as it is the congressional policy
manifested in the federal Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to con-
strue the scope of agreements covered by that Act, it is the congressional
intention expressed in some other statute on which the courts must rely to
identify any category of claims as to which agreements to arbitrate will be
held unenforceable.
Id.
38. Id. at 625-26. The Court clearly rejected the argument that statutory claims
were nonarbitrable simply because they were statutory in nature. The Court found no
"presumption against arbitration of statutory claims" and no basis in the Arbitration
Act itself "for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims." Id.
39. Id. at 628.
40. Id. The first step involves the question of whether the parties agreed to arbi-
trate the dispute. The court must determine whether the arbitration clause encom-
passes the dispute at issue. The Court applied the strong federal policy of resolving any
arbitrability issues in favor of arbitration to statutory claims, and stated that "the Act
itself provides no basis for disfavoring agreements to arbitrate statutory claims by
skewing the otherwise hospitable inquiry into arbitrability." Id. at 627.
41. Id. at 628.
6
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sought to include protection against waiver of a right to the judicial forum.' 2
After Mitsubishi, any statutory claim is subject to the general rule unless the
court finds it fails one of the steps in the analysis.'
8
The court in Steck would be forced to deal with the Mitsubishi mandate
which refused to find a presumption against arbitration of statutory claims in
the Arbitration Act.
11. THE CASE
Robert Steck was hired by the firm of Smith Barney, Harris Upham &
Co. in November of 1973 as an account executive." Pursuant to the rules of
the New York Stock Exchange, Steck executed an application and agreement
for approval as a registered representative of Smith Barney.48 This standard-
ized agreement stated that any controversy between the plaintiff and defend-
ant arising out of the termination of his employment shall be settled by arbi-
tration.'0 On September 29, 1984, Smith Barney terminated the plaintiff's
employment.'"
42. Id. The Court noted:
We must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded
by a given statute to include protection against waiver of the right to a judi-
cial forum, that intention will be deducible from text or legislative history ...
Having made the bargain to arbitrate, the party should be held to it unless
Congress itself has evinced an intention to preclude a waiver of judicial reme-
dies for the statutory rights at issue.
Id.
43. In its most recent decision regarding the arbitrability of statutory claims, the
Supreme Court has confirmed the validity of the Mitsubishi reasoning. See Shearsonl
American Express, 107 S. Ct. at 2332 (decided June 8, 1987). The Court considered
whether claims under the Securities Exchange Act and Racketeer Influenced and Cor-
rupt Organizations Act were arbitrable. Id. at 2335. The Court affirmed the general
rule that there is no presumption against arbitrability of statutory claims by stating the
Arbitration Act "mandates enforcement of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims."
Id. at 2337. The Court looked to the two-step analysis and noted that to defeat the
general rule, the party resisting arbitration "must demonstrate that Congress intended
to make an exception to the Arbitration Act ... an intention discernible from the text,
history, or purposes of the statute." Id. at 2338.
44. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 543.
45. id.
46. Id. at 544. Specifically, the agreement stated:
Any controversy between me and any member or member organization or
affiliate or subsidiary thereof arising out of my employment or the termina-
tion of my employment shall be settled by arbitration at the instance of any
such party in accordance with the arbitration procedure prescribed in the
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Steck filed suit in federal district court alleging that the termination con-
stituted unlawful discrimination based on age in violation of the ADEA."
Smith Barney moved the court pursuant to the Arbitration Act to require ar-
bitration of the ADEA claim." Smith Barney argued that the text and legisla-
tive history of the ADEA did not indicate Congressional intent to exempt
ADEA claims from the Arbitration Act." The court relied on the two-step
analysis set forth in Mitsubishi in determining whether the ADEA claim was
arbitrable. 51 Based on this framework, the court reasoned that "a statutory
claim is 'arbitrable'-that is, capable of being subject to arbitration by the
parties' prior agreement-unless there is a congressional intention, 'deductible
from text or legislative history' to the contrary.'" The court examined the
text and legislative history of the ADEA and statutes upon which it was
modeled and found congressional intent to preclude waiver of judicial reme-
dies."3 Based on this finding and judicial precedent involving analogous statu-
tory schemes, the court concluded that the plaintiff's ADEA claim was non-
arbitrable."
IV. THE DECISION
The critical part of the court's decision involved step two of the Mitsub-
ishi framework.5" The court examined the text and legislative history of the
ADEA and judicial precedent involving statutory rights with similar enforce-
ment procedures in an effort to determine whether Congress intended to pre-
clude a waiver of judicial remedies."
A. Text and Legislative History of the ADEA
The ADEA was enacted to promote the employment of older persons and





52. Id. at 544-45.
53. Id. at 547.
54. Id. at 546-47.
55. The court only briefly discussed step one finding the claim to be within the
scope of the arbitration clause in the contract. Id. at 545.
56. Id. at 545-46.
57. See 29 U.S.C. § 621. The explicit purpose of the ADEA is, "itlo promote
employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age; to prohibit arbi-
trary age discrimination in employment; to help employers and workers find ways of
meeting problems arising from the impact of age on employment."Id.; see H.R. REP.
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ing the ADEA were seriously debated by Congress.68 Congress was presented
with various bills which suggested enforcement schemes similar to those found
in the National Labor Relations Act" (hereinafter NLRA), the Fair Labor
Standards Act 0 (hereinafter FLSA), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Acts1
(hereinafter Title VII). The final bill as passed contained an enforcement
scheme similar to that found in the FLSA. s The text of the ADEA itself
explicitly states it is to be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies,
and procedures provided in the FLSA." Specifically, the ADEA authorizes
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or the aggrieved employee to
bring a civil action "for such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the
purposes of this chapter."'
The court in Steck interpreted the text and legislative history of the
58. See Lorillard v. Pons, 434 U.S. 575, 577-78 (1978).
59. Id. at 577. The Johnson Administration presented a bill with an enforcement
scheme similar to the NLRA. On January 23, 1967, President Johnson spoke to Con-
gress in support of an age discrimination bill. In that speech, he suggested a bill which
would be enforced through a law providing for "conciliation, and if necessary, enforce-
ment through cease and desist orders, with court review." CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 30-A
(1967). Pursuant to this speech, the Secretary of Labor introduced the Administration
bill granting power to the Secretary of Labor to enforce the provisions by issuing cease
and desist orders subject to judicial review, but with no private right of action. See
Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 578; See also, 113 CONG. REC. 1377 (1967). This scheme is
similar to that found in § 10(c) and § 10(e) of the NLRA.
60. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 577-78. Senator Javits introduced Senate bill 788
which placed enforcement within the Department of Labor while also allowing the ag-
grieved individual to bring a civil action. See 113 CONG. REC. 7076-7077 (1967). As
originally introduced, the bill placed enforcement in the hands of the Wage and Hour
division of the Department of Labor and permitted court action by either the Depart-
ment of Labor or the aggrieved party. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 723, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 13 (1967) (remarks of Senator Javits on S. 788). This scheme was essentially the
one set forth in the FLSA. In describing the enforcement scheme finally adopted in the
ADEA, Senator Javits stated "the enforcement techniques provided by [the ADEA]
are directly analogous to those available under the Fair Labor Standards Act, in fact
[the ADEA] incorporates by reference, to the greatest extent possible, the provisions of
[the FLSAJ." 113 CONG. REC. 31254 (1967).
61. See Lorillard, 434 U.S. at 578.
62. See Pub. L. 90-202, § 7, 81 Stat. at 604.
63. See 29 U.S.C. § 626(b). The bill states that "the provisions of this chapter
shall be enforced in accordance with the powers, remedies, and procedures provided in
sections 211(b), 216 (except for subsection (a) thereof) and 217 of this title." Id.
64. Id. at 626(b) & 626(c). It should be noted that the original administration
and enforcement of the ADEA was vested in the Department of Labor. However, pur-
suant to section 2 of Reorganization Plan No. I of 1978, 43 F.R. 19807 (1978), re-
printed in 42 U.S.C. app. at 38 (1978), and in 92 Stat. 3781 (1978), administration
and enforcement was transferred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
effective July 1, 1979.
19881
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ADEA as granting broad access to the courts." The court reasoned that clear
Congressional intent to provide this access would be violated by forcing these
claims into arbitration." Specifically, the court reasoned that the broad range
of relief permitted by the ADEA indicated arbitration would fail to vindicate
the rights guaranteed by the ADEA. 67 This broad range of relief was neces-
sary to effectively secure the rights under the ADEA." The court concluded
this relief was beyond an arbitrator's authority so that arbitration could not
effectively secure rights as Congress intended." These textual and historical
factors indicated to the court that Congress intended to preclude a waiver of
judicial remedies under the ADEA .7
B. Prior Precedent Involving Analogous Statutes
The essence of the court's decision rests firmly on the recognition that
important similarities exist between the ADEA and both the FLSA and Title
VII.71 The importance of this recognition is that the Supreme Court had ear-
65. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 545-46. The court did so by looking to the reasoning
of the Supreme Court in Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight System, Inc., 450 U.S.
728 (1981). The Supreme Court in Barrentine interpreted the enforcement scheme of
the FLSA as guaranteeing broad access to the courts. Id. at 740. The court in Steck
noted the similarity in enforcement schemes between the FLSA and ADEA and rea-
soned that the ADEA also granted broad access to the courts. See Steck, 661 F. Supp.
at 545-46.
66. Id. at 546-47. The court concluded that an arbitrator "has no general author-
ity to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain of the parties." Id. at 546. The
court saw the following unacceptable result if claims were forced into arbitration:
Therefore [since the arbitrator cannot invoke public laws], if required to arbi-
trate his ADEA claims, plaintiff risks having his statutory rights subordinated
to the terms of the contract in contravention of the ADEA's purpose. In the
alternative, if the arbitrator bases his decision upon the substantive guaran-
tees of the ADEA exclusively, the arbitrator has exceeded the scope of his
authority, which may render his decision null and void. Under either scenario,
compelling arbitration fails to vindicate the rights guaranteed by the ADEA
in contravention of Congressional intent.
Id. at 546-47.
67. Id. at 546. The broad range of relief is found in the language of the ADEA
wherein it permits "such legal or equitable relief as may be appropriate." 29 U.S.C. §
626(b). The court stated that such relief would include injunctive relief as necessary to
protect rights under the ADEA. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 546. This relief would be
outside the arbitrator's authority so that full rights under the ADEA could not be
protected. Id.
68. Id. at 546.
69. Id. Specifically, the court only mentioned injunctive relief as outside the arbi-
trator's authority. See supra, note 63.
70. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 547.
71. Id. at 545. The court states:
Though the Supreme Court has not addressed the arbitrability of the ADEA
[Vol. 1988
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Her decided cases involving arbitrability under FLSA and Title VII while no
ADEA case had yet been decided. 7' The Supreme Court concluded in both
cases that judicial remedies were not precluded by arbitration.7 3 The Court
based this conclusion on two basic findings. First, the statutes vested final re-
sponsibility for enforcement of these statutory rights with the courts so that
deferral to arbitration would violate this intention. 74 Second, arbitration would
be an inadequate forum to secure rights under these statutes." The court in
Steck would rely heavily on these conclusions in reaching its decision.
The Title VII case relied on by the court was Alexander v. Gardner-Den-
ver Co.76 The issue before the Court was whether submission of an employee's
claim to arbitration would preclude a statutory right to trial de novo under
Title VII.7 7 A claim of discharge without just cause based on racial discrimi-
nation was submitted to arbitration and decided adversely to the employee.78
The employee filed suit in district court alleging racial discrimination in viola-
tion of Title VII.V 9 The district court found and the court of appeals affirmed
that the employee "was bound by the arbitral decision and thereby precluded
from suing his employer under Title VII.' s
In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court reversed and held "rights
under Title VII are not susceptible to prospective waiver."81 The Court rea-
soned that the text of Title VII clearly vested full and final responsibility for
its enforcement in the courts so that deferral to arbitration would violate that
goal.88 The Court also observed that "legislative enactments in this area have
under the Federal Arbitration Act, the Court's precedent pertaining to these
analogous statutory schemes [FLSA and Title VII] supports the conclusion
that suits alleging violation of substantive rights conferred by ADEA can be
brought in federal court notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate.
Id. The court noted similarities in their aims, substantive provisions, and enforcement
procedures. Id.; see supra, note 4.
72. The Title VII case referred to by the court is Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974); the FLSA case is Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 728.
73. See 415 U.S. at 51; 450 U.S. at 746.
74. See id. at 45; 450 U.S. at 740-41.
75. See id. at 48-55; 450 U.S. at 742-46.
76. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 36.
77. Id. at 38-39.
78. Id. at 42.
79. Id. at 43.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 51-52.
82. Id. at 45-46. The Court noted that "the Act authorizes courts to issue injunc-
tive relief and to order such affirmative action as may be appropriate to remedy the
effects of unlawful employment practices." Id. at 44; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)
(civil action may be filed by Commission or aggrieved employee) and § 2000e-5(g)
(court may issue injunctive relief). The Court determined that "these provisions make
plain that federal courts have been assigned plenary powers to secure compliance with
Title VII." Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45. The Court found nothing in the text of Title
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long evinced a general intent to accord parallel or overlapping remedies
against discrimination."8 s This intent suggests that submission to one forum
does not preclude a later submission to another, but rather, that the differing
forums are designed to supplement not supplant one another in order to pro-
mote the policies underlying each system." Finally, the Court reasoned that
"'arbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual dis-
putes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final reso-
lution of rights created by Title VII."8 The specific role of the arbitrator and
the limitations placed on arbitration cause them to be inappropriate."
The court in Steck relied on the analysis of the Supreme Court by which
it concluded that deferral to arbitration would be inconsistent with Congress'
intent of vesting final enforcement responsibility with the courts.' The en-
forcement provisions are similar so that the court in Steck reasoned if Con-
gressional intent under Title VII precluded a waiver of judicial remedies, simi-
lar language in the ADEA would do the same."
The court in Steck also looked to the Supreme Court's conclusion in Al-
exander that arbitration would be an inappropriate forum for protection of
these rights.8' Specifically, the court noted that an arbitrator "has no general
authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain between the par-
ties."" This limitation on the arbitrator suggests that either an ADEA claim
will be subordinated to the terms of a contract, or an arbitrator's decision
based on ADEA provisions will be null and void as outside the scope of his
authority so that "compelling arbitration fails to vindicate the rights guaran-
teed by the ADEA in contravention of Congressional intent."' 1 Finally, re-
VII to suggest "that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual's right to
sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction." Id. at 47.
83. Id. The Court found that Title VII provided for enforcement of its provisions
in several different forums, including the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
state and local agencies, and federal courts. Id.
84. Id. at 48-50. The differing forums for enforcement led the Court to conclude
that Title VII "strongly suggest[s] that an individual does not forfeit his private cause
of action if he first pursues his grievance to final arbitration under the nondiscrimina-
tion clause of a collective-bargaining agreement." Id. at 50.
85. Id. at 56.
86. Id. at 52-58. Specifically, the Court pointed to the arbitrator's inability to
invoke public laws, his mandate to follow the contract, his specialized knowledge of the
law of the shop only, and the inferior factfinding of arbitration, i.e. record not as com-
plete in arbitral proceedings, rules of evidence do not apply, procedural aspects of trial
such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and testimony under oath are
limited or unavailable. Id.
87. Steck, 661 F.Supp. at 545.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 546,
90. Id.
91. Id. at 545-47
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garding nonarbitrability, the court interpreted Alexander as finding Title VII
claims to be exempt from the Arbitration Act and hence nonarbitrable due to
the text granting courts full enforcement power over Title VII." The court in
Steck noted these same textual indications are found in the ADEA and looked
to this reasoning in finding ADEA claims nonarbitrable."8
The FLSA case relied on by the court was Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best
Freight System, Inc." The issue before the Supreme Court was whether an
employee may bring a court action alleging a violation of the FLSA after
having unsuccessfully submitted that exact claim to a grievance committee.' 5
The lower courts concluded the claim was barred by being voluntarily submit-
ted to arbitration and, therefore, the courts refused to consider the FLSA
claim."
The Supreme Court reversed for essentially the same reasons given in
Alexander.'" The broad access to the courts granted by the FLSA and the
reality that arbitration would be an inadequate forum for vindication of those
rights caused the Court to again conclude that judicial remedies were not pre-
cluded by prior submission to arbitration.' The Court mentioned several rea-
sons why FLSA rights would be lost if submitting a claim to arbitration pre-
cluded a later court action." For instance, the union may fail to support the
claim properly due to majoritarian reasons; 1 "0 the arbitrator may lack compe-
tence to decide the ultimate legal issues;101 the arbitrator has no authority to
invoke public laws that would conflict with the contract;1Os the arbitrator is to
uphold the contract, not statutory law;10' the arbitrator cannot grant the broad
range of relief often required.'" The Court held that arbitration did not pre-
92. Id. at 546.
93. Id. at 546-47. This finding was critical to the court as it noted the conclusion
of nonarbitrability in Alexander was in line with Mitsubishi. Id. at 547.
94. 450 U.S. at 728.
95. Id. at 730-31.
96. Id. at 735. The court of appeals concluded that "wage and hour disputes
arising under the FLSA... may be the subject of binding arbitration where the collec-
tive bargaining agreement so provides . . . at least in situations in which employees
knowingly and voluntarily submit their grievances to arbitration under the terms of the
agreement." Id.
97. Id. at 739-46.
98. Id. at 745-46.
99. Id. at 742-45.
100. Id. The court reasoned that a union's objective is to benefit the group as a
whole, not individual employees, so that individual rights would be inadequately pro-
tected. id.
101. Id. at 743.
102. Id. at 744.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 745. Specifically, the Court noted an arbitrator could not award liqui-
dated damages, costs or attorney's fees while a court is authorized to do so under the
FLSA. Id.. see also 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (aggrieved employee explicitly permitted to
1988]
13
Rodenberg: Rodenberg: To Arbitrate or Not to Arbitrate - The Protection of Rights
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1988
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
elude a later court action "because Congress intended to give individual em-
ployees the right to bring their minimum-wage claims under the FLSA in
court, and because these congressionally granted FLSA rights are best pro-
tected in a judicial forum rather than in an arbitral forum."' "
The court in Steck relied most heavily on the Barrentine decision because
of the clear intent of Congress that the ADEA be enforced in accordance with
the provisions of the FLSA.'" The clear decision in Barrentine was that
FLSA rights are not waivable as the enforcement scheme provided by the
FLSA granted broad access to the courts and the protection of these rights
required a judicial rather than an arbitral forum.107 Because of the unequivo-
cal similarities in enforcement schemes, it was a short step for the court in
Steck to "deduce an implicit non-waiver intent from the ADEA's text and
legislative history." 108 Regarding nonarbitrability, the court interpreted Bar-
rentine as finding FLSA claims to be "exclusively judicially enforceable" and
hence nonarbitrable due to the text granting broad remedial power to the
courts.'" It was again a short step for the court to find ADEA claims nonarbi-
trable by relying on similar textual indications in the ADEA." °
In addition to Supreme Court precedent involving analogous statutory
schemes, the court in Steck looked to a decision by the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit involving federal statutory rights under the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act of 197411 (hereinafter ERISA). In Zipf v.
American Telephone & Telegraph Co.," 32 the plaintiff was discharged for ex-
cessive absenteeism one day before she would have qualified for substantial
benefits under the defendant's benefit plan.1 1 3 The plaintiff filed suit under
Section 5 10 of ERISA which protected employees from interference with ben-
recover liquidated damages, costs and reasonable attorney's fees in a court action).
105. Id. at 746.
106. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 546. This reliance is explicit in the opinion when the
court states by "reading Barrentine in conjunction with the Supreme Court's holding in
Lorillard, supra, requiring that the ADEA be enforced in accordance with the proce-
dures and remedies in the FLSA, this court deduces an implicit non-waiver intent from
the ADEA's text and legislative history." Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. The importance of this finding was that the court in Steck concluded
this was in line with Mitsubishi.
l10. Id. at 546-47.
111. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 (1974).
112. 799 F.2d 889 (3d Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 890. The plaintiff was diagnosed as having rheumatoid arthritis which
occasionally caused her to be absent from work. The terms of the employer's plan spec-
ified that under disability benefits, an employee would be entitled to those benefits on
the eighth calendar day of absence from work. During the period of the illness that led
to her discharge, the plaintiff had been absent from work seven days when she was
notified she would be discharged. Id.
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efit rights and provided for suit in federal court to protect those rights.114 The
issue before the court was "whether a participant in a federally regulated em-
ployee benefits plan must exhaust internal administrative remedies before fil-
ing suit in federal court for alleged interference with her statutory rights."' 1 '
The court held that no exhaustion of administrative remedies was neces-
sary before filing suit."16 The court's reasoning was three-fold. First, the legis-
lative history of Section 510 and the explicit language of the Section indicate
Congressional intent to provide protection of ERISA rights by the courts.1
7
Second, statutory interpretation is a matter within the court's expertise so that
the need for deference to administrative expertise is absent."' Third, judicial
resolution provides a "consistent source of law" to guide employer actions and
thereby secure employee rights. 1"'
The court in Steck found the analysis in Zipf to be instructive. The pri-
mary basis for the decision in Zipf rested on the text and legislative history of
the pertinent statutory section.120 This same analysis was followed in Steck."'
In addition, the court in Steck looked to another part of the analysis in Zipf
and found a justification for nonarbitrability not mentioned in Alexander or
Barrentine. The court in Zipf pointed to Congressional interest in judicial res-
olution as necessary to provide a "consistent source of law to help plan fiducia-
ries and participants predict the legality of proposed actions." " The court in
Steck applied this same consideration to the ADEA and concluded the Con-
gressional intent to prevent age discrimination in employment "requires the
development of a consistent body of judicial precedent to guide employer ac-
tions."'12 The importance of the decision in Zipf for the court in Steck went
beyond the Zipf court's reasoning, however, as the court noted the Zipf deci-
sion had been reviewed in light of Mitsubishi and the analysis was held not in
contravention of Mitsubishi."4 This gave the court in Steck Third Circuit pre-
114. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 1140 (protection provided from interference with
benefit plan) and § 1451 (aggrieved employee permitted to bring civil action).
115. Zipf, 799 F.2d at 889.
116. Id. at 894.
117. Id. at 892 n.3. The court noted that in the discussion of the bill, the remedy
for Section 510 was to be provided by the courts. The court quoted from the legislative
history of the bill wherein Senator Javits affirmed an aggrieved individual would have
to go to court to seek a remedy. Id.
118. Id. at 893.
119. Id.
120. See supra, note I 1.
121. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 547. The court in Steck specifically mentioned the
Zipf court's reliance on text and legislative history and noted that the same intent to
provide judicial access was found in the ADEA. Id.
122. Zipf, 799 F.2d at 893.
123. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 547.
124. Id. The Zipf decision was reviewed by the court in Gavalik v. Continental
Can Co., 812 F.2d 834 (3d Cir. 1987). In reviewing the Zipf decision in the light of
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cedent, in line with Mitsubishi, which held that other remedial procedures
need not be exhausted before seeking relief in federal court.
In summary, the court in Steck, by looking to the text and legislative
history of the ADEA and judicial precedent in Alexander, Barrentine, and
Zipf, concluded not only that prior arbitration did not preclude further judi-
cial action, but also that claims under the ADEA were nonarbitrable so that a
party could not be compelled to arbitrate an ADEA claim.1'5 The court dis-
cussed three reasons for this decision. First, the text and legislative history of
the ADEA grants broad access to the courts which would be violated if claims
were forced into arbitration.1" Second, the inability of arbitration to fully vin-
dicate the rights guaranteed by the ADEA make it inappropriate for ADEA
claims. 1 7 Third, the need for a body of judicial precedent to guide employers
so that ADEA rights are uniformly protected.1"
V. ANALYSIS
The decision in Steck would have been uneventful had the court been able
to limit its holding to a finding that prior arbitration does not preclude further
judicial action. The precedent in Barrentine alone would confirm this conclu-
sion. However, the factual situation presented to the court made it necessary
for the court to determine whether rights under the ADEA could be brought
in federal court notwithstanding a prior agreement to arbitrate. Faced with
this issue, the court concluded that ADEA claims were nonarbitrable, that is,
not capable of being subjected to arbitration.1"9 It is this conclusion that
makes the decision in Steck problematic. The conclusion is improper if the
reasoning used by the court is in conflict with the Mitsubishi mandate.
The court's discussion of the text and legislative history of the ADEA
may be in contravention of the Mitsubishi mandate. 1" For the court to con-
clude that ADEA claims are nonarbitrable, it must find that Congress in-
Mitsubishi, the court in Gavalik stated, "the Zipf court did not resort to a presumption
of unarbitrability, but rather sought to ascertain Congressional intent on the question
of the arbitrability of substantive discrimination claims under § 510 of ERISA." Id. at
850. The court noted this approach did not contravene the two-step analysis found in
Mitsubishi. Id.
125. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 547.
126. Id. at 545-546.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 547.
129. Id.
130. To avoid a conflict with Mitsubishi, the analysis in Steck must reflect ad-
herence to the general rule in Mitsubishi that there is no presumption against the arbi-
trability of statutory claims. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 625. As an indication of this
adherence and in an effort to rebut the presumption so that the mandate of the Arbi-
tration Act can be avoided, the court must look to the statute and find that Congress
itself intended ADEA claims to be nonarbitrable. Id. at 628.
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tended to foreclose the use of arbitration.81 Since the text of the ADEA no-
where forecloses the use of arbitration, it is the necessity of finding this
specific intent that makes the Steck holding questionable. The court looked to
the reasoning in Alexander and Barrentine and inferred this intent from the
ADEA's granting broad access to the courts and a broad range of remedial
relief available only in the courts."'2 It is this inference which may contravene
Mitsubishi.
The inference is problematic in that it is based on a misplaced reliance on
Alexander and Barrentine. Neither case deals with whether statutes with simi-
lar enforcement schemes to that found in the ADEA foreclose the use of arbi-
tration. The issue of nonarbitrability was not before the court. Both cases in-
volved whether prior arbitration precluded subsequent judicial action. '3  The
Supreme Court's conclusion in these cases should be limited to a finding that a
statutes broad grant of judicial access with judicially enforceable remedies as-
sures judicial remedies despite prior arbitration.'"
The court in Steck misinterprets both Alexander and Barrentine when it
suggests that textual provisions similar to those found in the ADEA indicate
Congressional intent rendering FLSA and Title VII claims nonarbitrable. 13
The precise issue before the court makes such a conclusion without support.
While these textual provisions may indicate a clear intent to preclude a waiver
of judicial remedies, it proves too much to infer the intent to foreclose the use
131. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628. It is only the finding of this specific intent
in the text of the ADEA that would satisfy Mitsubishi and exempt the claim from the
mandate of the Arbitration Act.
132. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 545-47. The court saw in these textual provisions the
implication that arbitration should be foreclosed.
133. See Alexander, 414 U.S. at 39; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 730-31.
134. See 415 U.S. at 60; 450 U.S.at 740. The reliance in Steck is hence mis-
placed in that the court attempts to stretch the rather specific and limited holdings in
Alexander and Barrentine to cover a different factual situation.
135. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 546. The court states as follows:
In finding that Congress intended the judicial access guaranteed by Title VII
and FLSA to be inviolate, thereby rendering these claims non-arbitrable
under Mitsubishi, the Supreme Court relied on various statutory indicators
also present in the text and legislative history of the ADEA. For example, the
Court pointed to the legislative mandate granting courts plenary enforcement
power over Title VII as an indication of Congressional intent to exempt Title
VII claims from the Arbitration Act .... The Supreme Court reasoned that
in granting courts broad authority to order 'such [remedial] affirmative action
as may be appropriate' Congress clearly intended Title VII [should be FLSA
rights] to be exclusively judicially enforceable.
Id. These conclusions by the court in Steck are misleading. The Supreme Court did not
in either Alexander or Barrentine conclude that FLSA or Title VII claims were nonar-
bitrable. This was not the issue before the Court. The Court nowhere states that Title
VII claims are exempt from the Arbitration Act. Nor does the Court state that FLSA
claims are to be exclusively judicially enforced. Id.
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of other remedial processes. The intent to preclude a waiver of judicial reme-
dies does not prove that arbitration is foreclosed.131 Furthermore, in Alexan-
der, the Court explicitly affirmed that a party could pursue either forum with-
out preclusion from the other."37
While the analysis in Alexander and Barrentine may be instructive, it is
not dispositive of whether the text and legislative history of the involved stat-
utes foreclose the use of arbitration. The court in Steck takes the sound rea-
soning in these cases and tries to make it support a conclusion beyond their
scope. The intent to preclude a waiver of judicial remedies is not the same as
the intent to foreclose arbitration. The defendant in Steck attempted to raise
the limited value of these cases due to the differing statutes and issues, but the
court dismisses this attempt by implying that its decision was based on an
independent interpretation of Congressional intent relative to the ADEA and
was, therefore, not in contravention of Mitsubishi.'" Unfortunately for the
court, this conclusory statement is not strengthened by the reasoning found in
the opinion. The court's finding of nonarbitrability is not supported by either
the text or legislative history of the ADEA or the reasoning in the Supreme
Court cases on which it so heavily relies.
The court's discussion of the adequacy of arbitration as a reason for hold-
ing ADEA claims nonarbitrable may likewise be in contravention of Mitsub-
ishi. The Court in Mitsubishi observed "we are well past the time when judi-
cial suspicion of the desirability of arbitration and of the competence of
arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of arbitration as an alternative
means of dispute resolution.1113 9 In accordance with this observation, the Court
rejected arguments for nonarbitrability of statutory claims based on the inade-
quacy of arbitration. The potential complexity of the claim, the streamlined
136. In essence, the court in Steck tries to take reasoning which supports one
conclusion and apply it to prove a totally different conclusion. The court fails to ade-
quately take into consideration the difference between finding intent to preclude and
intent to foreclose.
137. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52.
138. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 546. The defendant relied on a separate opinion by
Judge Adam's in Jacobson v. Merrill Lynch, Pearce, Fenner & Smith, 797 F.2d 1197
(3d Cir. 1987). Judge Adams, in considering whether statutory claims were subject to
arbitration, saw Barrentine and Alexander as limited by Mitsubishi's rule that no pre-
sumption against arbitrability exists so that "[alt most, those cases may be seen as
construing the intent underlying the particular statutes at issue, or as a rule of preclu-
sion and not of arbitrability, or perhaps as a special presumption against labor arbitra-
tors because of their limited expertise outside the labor field." Id. at 1207. In dis-
missing the defendant's argument, the court in Steck looked to another Third Circuit
decision dealing with the Jacobson decision. The Third Circuit concluded that neither
Mitsubishi nor Jacobson would be violated as long as the arbitrability of federal statu-
tory claims was based on statutory interpretation and not "judicially recognized public
policy." Gavalik, 812 F.2d at 850.
139. Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 626-27.
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procedures of arbitration, and the fear that arbitration will not follow the law
and thereby fail to protect the substantive rights were rejected by the Court as
evidence of nonarbitrability.'" The clear mandate in Mitsubishi is that it is
the intent found in the text of the statute, not the logical conclusions of the
courts regarding the adequacy of arbitration, that is determinative."' The rea-
soning of the court in Steck that the failure of arbitration to fully vindicate
the rights guaranteed by the ADEA is in conflict with Mitsubishi.
The court may have again mistakenly relied on Alexander and Barren-
tine. The validity of considering the adequacy of arbitration may be justified
in Alexander and Barrentine because of the precise issue before the Court.
The Court considered whether judicially guaranteed access and remedies could
be lost by prior arbitration. The ability of arbitration to vindicate statutory
rights becomes critical if judicial access is to be precluded by prior arbitration
as the Congressional intent to provide a judicial forum with its attendant pro-
tection and enforcement would clearly be violated.'" However, where the stat-
ute does not foreclose the use of arbitration, the Supreme Court has refused to
violate the agreement to arbitrate based on the inadequacy of arbitration.' 4" A
finding of nonarbitrability based on the inadequacy of arbitration places the
court in contravention of the Mitsubishi mandate.
The court briefly refers to one other reason in support of its finding of
nonarbitrability. The court states that "the realization of Congress' in-
tent ...requires the development of a consistent body of judicial precedent
to guide employer actions. 1 44 There is no support in the legislative history of
the ADEA for this statement, and it is a bold assumption that a "consistent"
body of judicial precedent will develop and aid in securing rights under the
140. Id. at 634-36.
141. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 544. The court noted that determining the arbi-
trability of statutory claims is a matter of statutory interpretation and is not to be
based on "judicially recognized public policy." Id. However, the court's analysis indi-
cates it is relying to some extent on judicially recognized public policy regarding the
adequacy or arbitration.
142. See Alexander, 415 U.S. at 45; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 740-41. The impor-
tant consideration in determining whether the adequacy of arbitration is relevant is
Congressional intent in the statute. If the statute expresses the intent to provide a judi-
cial forum, the adequacy of arbitration is relevant in considering whether an individual
is precluded from bringing a judicial action. If the use of arbitration does not afford the
type of protection given by the courts, it could be argued that congressional intent to
provide judicial remedies is violated.
143. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 632-37. Furthermore, the Supreme Court in
Shearson/American Express noted that the mistrust of arbitration that formed the ba-
sis for earlier decisions "is difficult to square with the assessment of arbitration that has
prevailed since that time." Shearson/American Express, 107 S.Ct. at 2341. It is the
strong national policy in favor of arbitration that makes the adequacy of arbitration
unacceptable in a determination of whether arbitration is foreclosed.
144. Steck, 661 F. Supp. at 547.
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ADEA. Furthermore, it is Congressional intent as found in the text of the
statute that is critical and not the "realization" of Congressional intent. The
strength of this argument may be indicated by the court's very brief considera-
tion of it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In essence, the court in Steck made a two-fold decision. The court con-
cluded that the ADEA would preclude the waiver of judicial remedies. The
validity of this decision should be unquestioned in light of Supreme Court pre-
cedent. However, the court went one step further and concluded that ADEA
claims were nonarbitrable. It is this aspect of the decision that is problematic.
It is questionable whether the court found the necessary intent in the statute
to foreclose arbitration as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Mit-
subishi. The court itself suggests its decision may be questionable in light of
Mitsubishi.14 5 It would not appear that the decision in Steck will be lasting
judicial precedent on the arbitrability of ADEA claims."'
THOMAS D. RODENBERG
145. Id. The court seems to imply that it may be going beyond the Mitsubishi
decision. The court states that "[m]indful of Mitsubishi's mandate, this court neverthe-
less concludes for many of the same reasons offered in Barrentine, Gardner-Denver
[Alexander] and Zipf, that plaintiff's ADEA claims are non-arbitrable." Id. (emphasis
added).
146. However, two other jurisdictions have also considered the arbitrability of
ADEA claims and held that a judicial proceeding need not be stayed pending arbitra-
tion. See Jones v. Baskin, Flaherty, Elliot and Mannino, 670 F. Supp. 597 (D. Pa.
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